INTRODUCTION

Overview
A STANDARD MOTIVATION FOR GAME THEORY'S emphasis on Nash equilibrium is the conjecture that players will learn to play an equilibrium if they interact repeatedly. This paper focuses on a particular model of learning by optimizing players. In the model considered, two players engage in an infinitely repeated discounted game of complete information. Each chooses a repeated game strategy that is a best response to his prior belief as to his opponent's repeated game strategy. Rather than assume that prior beliefs are in equilibrium, one would like to argue that if beliefs are cautious then each player will choose a strategy that is in the support, loosely speaking, of his opponent's belief and that, therefore, players will learn as the game unfolds to predict the continuation path of play. If this conjecture were true, a convergence result due to Kalai and Lehrer (1993a), hereafter KL, would then imply that the continuation path of the repeated game would asymptotically resemble that of a Nash equilibrium. One would thus have constructed a theory in which Nash equilibrium behavior is a necessary long-run consequence of optimization by cautious players. 3 Informally, the intuition is that, whereas there are only countably many finite histories to serve as data for a player's learning, there are uncountably many continuation strategies. More formally, note that if a player can learn to predict the continuation path of play then, in particular, the player can learn to predict (the distribution over) play in the next period. Let a one-period-ahead prediction rule be a function that, for each history, chooses a probability distribution over the opponent's stage game actions. The probability distribution is the rule's prediction for the opponent's action in the next period. For any one-period-ahead prediction rule, whether or not derived via Bayesian updating, there exists an opposing strategy that does "the opposite." For example, suppose that in the stage game the opponent has two actions, Left and Right. For those repeated game histories in which the prediction rule forecasts "Left with probability p < 1/2" in the next period, let the strategy choose "Left with probability 1." Conversely, for those histories in which the prediction rule forecasts "Left with probability p > 1/2" in the next period, let the strategy choose "Right with probability 1." This strategy is well-formed (in particular, it is a function from the set of finite histories of the repeated game to the set of probability distributions over stage game actions) and against this strategy the prediction rule always gets the probability wrong by at least 1/2. Since the prediction rule was arbitrary, it follows that there is no one-period-ahead prediction rule that is asymptotically accurate against all strategies. repeated interaction, one wants to explain prediction without imposing equilibrium-like restrictions on prior beliefs.4
Conventional Strategies
The approach proposed here is to suppose that, associated with each player, there is a subset of repeated game strategies. For want of a better term, I will refer to such strategies as conventional. I will offer some possible examples below. Players are assumed to have a slight (e.g., lexicographic) preference for conventional strategies. Thus, a player will choose a conventional strategy if there is one that is a best response (in the standard sense of maximizing the expected present value of the player's stage game payoffs). If no conventional strategy is a best response, a player will optimize by choosing a nonconventional best response. For the moment, I put aside the possibility that players might be constrained to play conventional strategies.
Suppose that the following properties hold whenever each player's belief is, in some appropriate sense, cautious.
-1. Conventional Prediction. For any profile of conventional strategies, each player, via Bayesian updating of his prior belief, learns to predict the continuation path of play.5 2. Conventional Optimization. For each player there is a conventional strategy that is a best response.
Then, if beliefs are cautious, Conventional Optimization and the maintained interpretation of conventionality imply that each player, in choosing a best response, will choose a conventionLal strategy. Since both players play a conventional strategy, Conventional Prediction implies that each plAyer will learn to predict the continuation path of play. Thus players both optimize and learn to predict the path of play and hence the KL convergence theorem implies that the path of play will asymptotically resemble that of a Nash equilibrium.
While Conventional Prediction and Conventional Optimization hold trivially if the product set of conventional strategies consists of a single repeated game Nash equilibrium profile, such a conventional set assumes away the problem of equilibration. To satisfy the objective of not imposing equilibrium-like restrictions on prior beliefs, one wants beliefs to be cautious not only in the sense that beliefs satisfy some form of full support condition with respect to the conven-4 This is in contrast to the literature on learning within (Bayesian) equilibrium; see Jordan (1991) . In that literature, unlike here, players have incomplete information about each other's payoffs, which makes learning nontrivial even when equilibrium is assumed. S Thus, each player learns to predict the path of play regardless of which strategy he selects. Weakening the definition of Conventional Prediction would require constructing a model in which both a player's strategy choice and the set of paths of play that he can predict are determined jointly. There is a danger in such a model of inadvertently assuming away the problem of equilibration. In any event, KL attempts to finesse constructing such a model and I will attempt to do so as well. tional strategies but also in the sense that the conventional strategy sets are themselves neutral with respect to equilibration.
In this paper, neutrality will mean that the map, call it I, that assigns product sets of conventional strategies to games satisfies the following properties (the formal definition is in Section 3.1).
1. ! depends only on the stage game's strategic form. In particular, ! ignores both stage game payoffs and the discount factor. As I will discuss below, this does not imply that player beliefs ignore payoff information. One might argue that I should take into account payoff information at least in order to rule out nonrationalizable strategies. Doing so would somewhat restrict the scope of the paper's main Theorem without fundamentally changing the analysis. In many of the repeated games considered below, including all of the games based on 2 X 2 stage games, all strategies are rationalizable.
2. 1 is symmetric. In particular, I satisfies player symmetry and action symmetry.
(a) Player symmetry specifies that if both players have the same action set in the stage game then if some strategy o-is conventional for player 1, the strategy o-' that is equivalent to o-from player 2's perspective must be conventional for player 2. In conjunction with property 3(b) of neutrality (see below), player symmetry implies that if players have the same action set, their conventional sets will, in fact, be identical; see the Claim established in the Proof of Proposition 2.
(b) Action symmetry implies that if two possible action sets for player i have the same cardinality then, holding the opponent's action set fixed, the associated conventional sets for player i are identical up to a renaming of his stage game actions.
3. 1 is invariant to simple changes in strategy. If a strategy o-is conventional for player i, then so is any strategy o-' that is identical to 0r except that: (a) o-' in effect translates o-'s action choices according to some function on the set of player i's actions, or (b) o-' in effect translates input histories according to some bijection on the set of action profiles.
Such strategy changes are simple in the sense that if o-can be represented as a finite computer program, then a program for o-' can be constructed merely by adding a few lines of additional code to translate action choices, input histories, or both.6 If invariance is violated, then a player whose forecasts are persistently wrong may never notice that his opponent's behavior is consistent with a simple variation on one of the strategies that the player could learn to predict. This sort of thick-headedness runs counter to what one informally means by a player being cautious. 5. ' permits pure strategies. More accurately, for each conventional nonpure strategy, there should be at least one pure strategy in its support that is likewise conventional.7 If a conventional strategy is fully random (that is, after any history, it assigns positive probability to each of the available stage game actions), this property means only that some pure strategy is conventional. One motivation for this is that a randomizing strategy o-for player i is inherently more complicated than some of the pure strategies in its support. Explicitly, given o-, choose some (arbitrary) ranking for player i's stage game actions and consider the pure strategy s that, after any history h, chooses the highest ranked action to which o-(h) gives positive probability. For example, if player i has only two actions, Left and Right (ranked in that order), s chooses Left after any history such that o-randomizes. For any standard notion of complexity, o-is more complicated than s. Indeed, o-uses s as a kind of pattern and adds to s the additional complication of randomization after certain histories. If one views a conventional strategy set as being built up from less to more complicated strategies then, for any conventional randomizing strategy like o-, some pure strategy like s should be conventional as well.8 A product set of conventional strategies is neutral if there is neutral map ' such that the product set is in the image of W.
Neutrality is a property of the conventional sets rather than directly of beliefs. For example, as already noted, the fact that W ignores payoffs does not imply that each player's belief ignores payoffs. Similarly, players may have the same conventional set without their beliefs being identical. In fact, I require nothing of beliefs other than that players be able to learn to predict the path of play when the strategy profile is conventional. This property can be satisfied even if beliefs are in many respects quite arbitrary. For example, if the set of conventional strategies is at most countable, then it follows from results in KL that Conventional Prediction will hold provided only that each player's belief assigns 7A pure strategy s will be said to be in the support of a strategy a if, after any history, the action chosen by s is also chosen with positive probability by a. 8One might object that, while players might not deliberately favor randomization, it may be impossible to execute pure strategies because of "trembling." Thus, all conventional strategies should be random. As will be discussed in Section 3, see in particular Remark 3 and Remark 8, allowing for slight trembling does not materially affect the argument. positive probability to each of his opponent's conventional strategies, regardless of exactly how probability is assigned.
The prototypical examples of neutral, conventional sets are those consisting of strategies that satisfy some standard bound on complexity. Examples of such sets include the strategies that are memoryless (for example, strategies of the form, "in each period, play Left with probability p, Right with probability 1 -p, regardless of the history of date"), the strategies that remember only at most the last r periods, and the strategies that can be represented as a finite flow chart or program. It bears repeating that taking the conventional set to consist of the strategies that satisfy some complexity bound does not imply that players are constrained to such strategies or that players are in any customary sense boundedly rational. Rather, the implication is merely that players have a slight preference for strategies that are simple. This paper takes the point of view that, while one might ask a learning theory based on optimization and caution to be robust to deviation from neutrality, the theory should not require such deviation. For example, it would be disturbing if the theory required either player to view particular opposing strategies as nonconventional even though those strategies were computationally simple variants of conventional strategies. To the extent that the theory requires a deviation from neutrality, the theory requires some degree of equilibration prior to the start of repeated play.
The Main Result
The central result of this paper is the following Theorem, stated informally here.
In discounted repeated games based on stage games in which neither player has a weakly dominant action, if players are sufficiently impatient then for any neutral conventional set there is no belief for either player such that Conventional Prediction and Conventional Optimization both hold. Moreover, for many of these games, including repeated Matching Pennies, Rock/Scissors/Paper, and Battle of the Sexes, the same conclusion holds for any level of player patience.
As will be discussed in Remark 3 in Section 3.3, the Theorem is robust to small deviations from neutrality.
The Theorem states that, unless one is willing to violate neutrality, it is impossible in many games to formulate a model of learning that is closed in the sense that Conventional Optimization and Conventional Prediction both hold simultaneously. In particular, if the conventional set is neutral and if Conventional Prediction holds, then each player, in the course of optimizing, will choose a strategy that is not conventional. Player beliefs in such a model are naive: each player believes that the other plays a conventional strategy even though, in fact, neither plays a conventional strategy. Section 1.3 develops a simple learning model that exhibits this sort of naivete in a stark fashion. A somewhat more sophisticated example is provided by the learning model known as fictitious play, discussed in Section 1.4.2. In both examples, naivete can lead to a failure of convergence, in any reasonable sense, to even approximate Nash equilibrium behavior. What this naivete means in general for convergence to Nash equilibrium behavior is not known.
The argument underlying the Theorem runs as follows. For games of the sort described, for any pure strategy s for player 1, there are strategies s' for player 2 such that, under any such profile (s, s'), player 1 gets a low payoff in every period. For example, in repeated Matching Pennies, if s' is a best response to s, then under the profile (s, s'), player 1 gets a payoff of -1 in each period, whereas his minmax payoff is 0 per period. It follows that if s is a best response to player l's belief, then it must be that player 1 is convinced that player 2 will not choose s', so convinced that, if player 1 chooses s, he cannot, via Bayesian updating of his prior, learn to predict the continuation path of play should player 2, for whatever reason, choose s'. The problem that arises is that if s is conventional for player 1, then neutrality implies that at least one of the s'-type strategies will be conventional for player 2. Hence, either Conventional Prediction or Conventional Optimization must fail.
It might seem that this argument depends in an essential way on the fact that s was taken to be pure. After all, a player can often avoid doing poorly (in particular, earning less than his minmax payoff) by randomizing. But not doing poorly is not the same thing as optimizing. In fact, the Theorem extends to include conventional strategy sets that contain randomizing strategies. To see this, note that if a nonpure strategy is a best response to some belief, then so is every pure strategy in its support.9 Suppose that Conventional Prediction holds. Since I have assumed that, for any conventional nonpure strategy, some pure strategy in its support is also conventional, and since, by the above argument, no conventional pure strategy is optimal, it follows that no conventional nonpure strategy can be optimal either.10
To make the Theorem somewhat more concrete, consider any product conventional set consisting of strategies that satisfy a bound on complexity. Standard complexity bounds yield neutral conventional sets that are at most countable. As noted in the discussion of neutrality, it follows that for any such conventional set there are beliefs for which Conventional Prediction holds." To be optimal with respect to such beliefs, a strategy must be flexible enough to make use of the player's predictive ability. Such a strategy will necessarily be complicated. In fact, the Theorem implies that a player's best response will 9This fact, while standard for finite games, is less obvious for discounted infinitely repeated games. The Appendix provides a proof.
10It is natural to ask whether this negative result could be overturned if one allowed players to have a strict preference for randomization in some circumstances. This question will not be pursued here since it necessarily requires departing from standard subjective expected utility theory.
It is important to understand that prediction, not countability, is the central issue. The same argument would carry over to a complexity bound that yields an uncountable set provided Conventional Prediction continued to hold. violate the complexity bound defining conventionality.12 Any attempt to obtain Conventional Optimization by adding more complicated strategies into the conventional set is fruitless as long as neutrality is preserved: adding more complicated strategies just makes the best response that much more complicated. The only way to obtain Conventional Optimization is to add in so many strategies that Conventional Prediction is lost. In particular, if one takes the conventional set to be the set of all strategies (which is uncountable), Conventional Optimization holds, but, as argued above, Conventional Prediction fails.
Extensions: Constrained and Boundedly Rational Players
Although the primary focus of this paper is on players who are rational, in particular, on players who have unlimited ability to optimize, it is natural to ask whether the analysis would change fundamentally if players were constrained in some way.
Suppose first that each player's computational ability is unrestricted but that the rules of the repeated game are modified to require each player to choose a conventional strategy. For example, the conventional set might consist of the strategies that can be encoded as a finite list of instructions (a program) and the rules of the game might require players to submit their strategies in this form to a referee, who then executes the strategies on behalf of the players.
Given that players are constrained, the Theorem implies that players will be unable to optimize (assuming that the conventional set is neutral and that Conventional Prediction holds). This is not necessarily a disaster, since one might still hope to find conventional strategies that are approximate best responses. In order to apply convergence results along the lines of those in KL, the appropriate version of approximate optimization is what will be called uniform e optimization: a strategy is e optimal if it is e optimal ex ante and if, moreover, it induces an e optimal continuation strategy in every continuation game (more precisely, in every continuation game that the player believes can be reached with positive probability).
If the conventional set consists only of pure strategies, then the argument sketched above extends immediately to uniform e optimization. Therefore, for any neutral conventional set, if Conventional Prediction holds, then Conventional Uniform e Optimization fails for e sufficiently small. This need not prevent a player from choosing a strategy that is only ex ante e optimal. But, as illustrated in Section 1.3, ex ante e optimization per se may not be enough to guarantee convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium play.
12A potential source of confusion is that it is well known that many of the possible bounds on complexity generate conventional sets with the property that, for any conventional strategy, there is a conventional best response. There is no contradiction with the Theorem because this sort of closure looks only at beliefs that are degenerate in the sense of assigning all mass to a single strategy. A belief for which Conventional Prediction holds for a neutral conventional set is intrinsically nondegenerate.
If, on the other hand, the conventional set contains nonpure strategies, then the argument sketched above does not extend. Section 3.4.1 will show that, nevertheless, the first part of the Theorem, in which players are impatient, does extend for the benchmark case in which the conventional set consists of the strategies that can be represented as a finite program, even if the program has access to randomizers (coin tossers).
Finally, Section 3.4.2 contains some remarks about players who are boundedly rational, that is, players for whom deliberation is costly.
An Example
Consider the game Matching Pennies, given by:
For any discount factor, the unique Nash equilibrium strategy profile for repeated Matching Pennies calls for both players to randomize 50:50 in every period, following any history. Suppose that the conventional set, X for either player, consists of three strategies: randomize 50:50, "H always," denoted H, and "T always," denoted T. Thus, X = (50: 50, H, T}. Note that X x X is neutral.
Assume that each player's belief assigns probability one to the set X and positive probability to each of the three elements of X. I do not require that player beliefs be equal. It follows from results in KL that, for any such beliefs, Conventional Prediction holds. Thus, for example, if Player 2 plays H, Player 1 will observe a long initial string of H's, hence Player l's posterior will gradually favor the possibility that Player 2 is playing H, and so Player 1 will come to predict that Player 2 will continue to play H in subsequent periods. Now consider Conventional Optimization. Behavior under a best response must respond to the information learned over the course of the repeated game. In particular, if Player 1 learns to predict H, then Player 1 should start playing H in every period, while if Player 1 leams to predict T, he should start playing T in every period. None of the three strategies in X have this sort of flexibility. As a consequence, Conventional Optimization fails: none of the conventional strategies is a best response to any belief that gives weight to every strategy in X. If players optimize, players must, therefore, choose nonconventional strategies. This model thus exhibits the sort of naivete discussed in Section 1.2.3.
In this example, the players' naivete can lead to asymptotic behavior that is far from that of a Nash equilibrium. In particular, note that one optimal strategy for player 1, arguably the most obvious one, is to play H or T in the first period (the choice will depend on player l's prior belief) and then to switch permanently to H always if player 2 played H in the first period, or to T always if player 2 played T in the first period. A similar (but mirror image) strategy is optimal for player 2. If the players adopt such pure strategies, then from period 2 onward the continuation path will be either ((H, H), (H, H), .. . ),
((H, T), (H, T), ... ), ((T, H), (T, H), ... ), or ((T, T), (T, T), ... ), depending on
what happens in the first period (which in tum depends on player beliefs). None of these paths resembles a likely realization of the (random) Nash equilibrium path of play." Suppose instead that, as was discussed in Section 1.2.4, players are constrained to choose from among the three strategies in L. For e low, none of the conventional strategies is uniformly e optimal, again because none of the conventional strategies exploits the fact that the player leams to predict the path of play. If each player chooses a strategy that is merely ex ante e optimal, rather than uniformly e optimal, then each player will strictly prefer either H or T to 50:50, depending on his prior belief, unless his prior happens to put exactly equal weight on H or T. In the latter case, the player will be indifferent between all three strategies. But, if both players select pure strategies, then the path of play will be one of the four discussed in the previous paragraph, none of which resembles a likely realization of the Nash equilibrium path of play.
As this paper's Theorem indicates, the naivete illustrated above is not limited to Matching Pennies and in particular does not depend on the fact that Matching Pennies has no pure strategy equilibrium. Consider, for example, perturbing the stage game to the following: KL, together with its companion paper, Kalai and Lehrer (1993b), does two things. First, KL provides a condition on beliefs that is sufficient to ensure that a player learns to predict the path of play. The KL condition is in the spirit of (but is weaker than) assuming that each player puts positive prior probability on the actual strategy chosen by his opponent.15 Second, KL establishes that if players optimize and learn to predict the path of play, then the path of play asymptotically resembles that of a Nash equilibrium.16
While the KL sufficient condition for prediction is strong (from the discussion in Section 1.2.1, any such condition must be strong), it has the attractive feature that it imposes essentially no restriction on the player's belief over strategies other than his opponent's actual strategy. It would thus seem that a construction along the lines proposed above, in which the KL sufficient condition is satisfied by means of a full support assumption with respect to some set of conventional strategies, ought to work. That this construction fails stems from the fact that the joint requirement of prediction and optimization is far more burdensome than the requirement of prediction alone. This complicates the interpretation of KL and also of related papers such as Kalai and Lehrer (1995) .
By way of examyple, consider again the case of Matching Pennies with the conventional set X = {50: 50, H, T}. One would like to argue that the path of play will converge to that of the unique Nash equilibrium. The only conventional strategy profile for which this occurs is the one in which both players choose 50:50. Suppose then that both choose 50:50. The KL sufficient condition is satisfied provided only that each player assigns positive probability to the other choosing 50:50. But 50:50 will not be optimal for a player unless the player assigns zero, not just low, probability to both H and T.17 In this example, 50:50 15 The KL prediction result generalizes an earlier theorem of Blackwell and Dubins (1962) . For sufficient conditions that are weaker than the KL condition, see Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1994) and Sandroni (1995) . 16 The KL convergence result is intuitive but, for discount factors sufficiently close to 1, it is not immediate. Even if players accurately predict the continuation path of play, they can hold erroneous beliefs about what would happen at information sets off the path of play. KL, see also Kalai and Lehrer (1993b) , verifies that an equilibrium with approximately the same path of play can be constructed by altering strategies so as to conform with beliefs at unreached information sets. When there are more than two players, there are additional complications. See also Fudenberg and Levine (1993) . In the weak (pointwise convergence) topology, convergence is to the path of a true Nash equilibrium. In the strong (uniform convergence) topology, KL shows convergence only to the path of an e-Nash equilibrium. See also Sandroni (1995) . 17As discussed in Section 1.3, if player 1 assigns positive probability to every strategy in = (50: 50, H, T) then no conventional strategy is optimal. If player 1 assigns probability p E (0, 1) to 50:50 and probability 1 -p to H, then player l's best response is H, not 50:50. Similarly if player 1 assigns probability p to 50: 50 and probability 1 -p to T, then player l's best response is T, not 50:50.
can be optimal for both players only if beliefs are actually in equilibrium at the start of repeated play.
Fictitious Play and (Semi-) Rational Learning
For simplicity, I focus initially on stage games with two actions for each player.
The classical fictitious play model of Brown (1951) can be shown to be equivalent to a model in which each player optimizes with respect to the belief that this opponent is playing a memoryless strategy, that is, a strategy of the form "in any period, go Left with probability p, Right with probability 1 -p, regardless of history," with p, which is constant across all periods, drawn from a beta distribution. See, for example, Fudenberg and Levine (1996) . The set of memoryless behavior strategies, viewed as the conventional set, is neutral. One can show that Conventional Prediction holds (even though beliefs in this case violate the KL sufficient condition). Hence Conventional Optimization must fail. Thus, while players under fictitious play are rational in the sense that each chooses a best response to his belief, the beliefs themselves are naive: each player believes that his opponent adopts a memoryless strategy even though each, in fact, adopts a strategy that is history dependent.
Despite this naivete, there are many examples in which players under fictitious play do learn to predict the continuation path of play and hence play does converge to that of a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, even when prediction fails, play may still exhibit Nash equilibrium-like behavior. Consider, for example, Matching Pennies. Under fictitious play, each player in Matching Pennies leams to believe that his opponent is randomizing 50:50 even though the actual path of play is typically nonstochastic. Thus players do not leam to predict the actual path of play and the actual path does not converge, in the sense used here and in KL, to the stochastic path generated by the unique Nash equilibrium of repeated Matching Pennies. Nevertheless, both the empirical marginal and the empirical joint frequency distributions of play converge to that of the Nash equilibrium of Matching Pennies. Thus, behavior under fictitious play is consistent with many (although not all) of the observable consequences of players leaming to play the Nash equilibrium of Matching Pennies.
Unfortunately, fictitious play is not always so well behaved. In 2 x 2 stage games, while empirical marginal frequency distributions of play always converge to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the empirical joint frequency distribution may be inconsistent with Nash equilibrium. This point has been emphasized by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), Jordan (1993) , and Young (1993). Moreover, there are robust examples of stage games with more than two actions, or more than two players, in which even the empirical marginal frequency distributions fail to converge, a point originally made by Shapley (1962) ; see also Jordan (1993) . What is perhaps more disturbing is that, in the examples in which convergence fails, the path of play cycles in ways that are obvious to the outside analyst but that the players themselves fail to detect. These problems with asymptotic behavior under fictitious play stem from the fact that player beliefs are naive. While the message of this paper is that some degree of naivete may be unavoidable, one might still hope to construct theories of (semi-) rational learning in which players are more sophisticated than in fictitious play. For recent work along these general lines, see Fudenberg and Levine (1995b), Fudenberg and Levine (1995a), Fudenberg and Levine (1996) , Aoyagi (1994) , and Sonsino (1995) . A feature of much of this literature is that players are modeled as using strategies that are intuitively sensible without necessarily being best responses to well-formed prior beliefs. Justifying these strategies as optimal or near optimal may require enriching the repeated game model or deviating from standard decision theory, or both.
Problems with Rationality
Binmore, in Binmore (1987) and elsewhere, has warned that the concept of rationality in game theoxy may be vulnerable to problems akin to the unsolvability of the Halting Problem; see also Anderlini (1990) .
Following Binmore, view a player in a one-shot game as choosing a decision procedure, a function that, taking as input a description of the opponent's decision procedure, chooses as output an action of the game. This formalism is an attempt to capture the idea that a player, in choosing his action, predicts his opponent's action by thinking through the game from his opponent's perspective. Since a player is assumed to know his opponent's decision procedure, the player can predict his opponent's action. The goal is to construct a decision procedure that, for any opposing decision procedure, chooses an action that is a best response to the action chosen by the opponent's decision procedure.
It is not hard to see that no decision procedure is optimal for Matching Pennies.18 Perhaps more surprisingly, there may be no optimal decision procedure even in games with equilibria in pure actions. The basic difficulty is that there are so many possible opposing decision procedures that there may be no decision procedure that optimizes with respect to them all. Canning (1992) shows that, for a large set of games with equilibria in pure actions, one can close the decision problem by limiting players to domains (subsets) of decision procedures. Here "close the decision problem" means that a player finds it optimal to choose a decision procedure within the domain whenever his opponent's decision procedure is likewise within the domain. As Canning (1992) emphasizes, the domains, while nontrivial, necessarily embody rules of equilibrium selection. In games with multiple equilibria, different rules of equilibrium selection give rise to different domains. 18 If players are constrained to play pure actions, the case originally considered in the literature, then the existence of an optimal decision procedure would imply the existence of a pure action Nash equilibrium, which is false. An argument similar to the one given in footnote 3 establishes that no decision procedure can be optimal even if players can randomize.
The overlap between this paper and the literature just sketched would appear to be small. In this paper, neither player knows the other's decision procedure (indeed, a player's decision procedure for choosing a strategy is not even explicitly modeled), and neither player knows the other's repeated game strategy. Each player merely has a belief as to his opponent's strategy and one would like to permit each player's belief to be inaccurate in the sense of assigning considerable probability mass to strategies other than the one his opponent is actually playing. But while neither player in the present model may have accurate knowledge of his opponent ex ante, the insistence on prediction means that players will have increasingly accurate knowledge as the game proceeds. If the conventional set is neutral, asking for a conventional strategy that is optimal when Conventional Prediction holds is akin to asking in Binmore's model for a decision procedure that is optimal against all (or at least a large set of) opposing decision procedures. Conversely, the domain restrictions discussed in Canning (1992) are suggestive of the deviations from neutrality that would have to obtain if Conventional Prediction and Conventional Optimization were to hold simultaneously.
SOME BACKGROUND ON REPEATED GAMES
Basic Definitions
Consider a 2-player game G = (A1, A2, u1, u2) , the stage game, consisting of, for each player i, a finite action set Ai and a payoff function ui: A1 x A2 -S R.
The stage game is repeated infinitely often. After each period, each player is informed of the action profile (al, a2) EA1 xA2 realized in that period. The set of histories of length T, AT, is the T-fold Cartesian product of A1 XA2. A contains the single abstract element h?, the null history. The set of all finite histories is X= U T 2 oTe I will sometimes write ZA1, A2) to emphasize the dependence of t on (A1, A2). An infinite history, that is, an infinite sequence of action profiles, is called a path of play. The set of paths of play is denoted by Z. The projection of a path of play z E.2' onto its period t coordinate is denoted z,. The projection of z onto its first t coordinates, that is, the t-period initial segment of z, is denoted i(z, t); note that i(z, t) Er'.
A (behavior) strategy for player i is a function o-: r*-A(Ai), where A(Ai) is the set of probability mixtures over Ai. I will sometimes write vi to emphasize that the strategy is associated with player i. Let Xi be the set of behavior strategies of player i. I will sometimes write Xi(A1, A2) to emphasize the dependence of Xi on (A1, A2). A pure strategy for player i is simply a behavior strategy that takes values only on the vertices of A(Ai). Let Si c Xi be the set of pure strategies for Player i.
Strategy ay * E Xi will be said to share the support of strategy a-E X iff, for any history, h, if a*(h) assigns positive probability to action a E Ai, then so does ao(h). In the case of a pure strategy, a* =s, I will say that s is in the support of a. X1 X X2 denotes the set of behavior strategy profiles in the repeated game. For each t, a behavior strategy profile (o-r, o-2) induces a probability distribution over cylinders C(h), where h is a t-period history and C(h) is the set of paths of play for which the t-period initial segment equals h. These distributions can in turn be extended in a natural way to a distribution , ?2) over (Z,J), where -9 is the smallest a-algebra containing all the subsets formed by the cylinders; Kalai and Lehrer (1993a) 
Continuation Games
A t-period history h defines a continuation game, the subgame beginning at period t + 1. Payoffs for the continuation game starting at date t + 1 are taken to be discounted to date t + 1, rather than back to date 1. In the continuation game following h, a strategy o-i induces a continuation strategy oih via oih(hW) = oi(h -h') for any history h', where h -h' denotes the concatenation of h and h'.
With this notation, a player's posterior belief about his opponent's continuation strategy has a simple representation. If ,u(ty , )(C(h)) > 0 then, in the continuation game following h, player l's posterior belief, calculated in standard Bayesian fashion, is o2'h; similarly for player 2.
Recalling that i(z, t) is the history giving the actions chosen in the first t periods of the path of play z, we may write 0i.(z t), 9
(zt), and O2(z t).
Prediction
Informally, if the chosen strategy profile is pure, a player will be said to learn to predict the continuation path of play if, for any number of periods 1, no matter how large, and any degree of precision q, no matter how small, there is a time t far enough in the future such that, at any time after t, a player predicts every continuation history of length 1 or less with an error of no more than q. The definition below, in addition to providing a formal statement, extends this idea to cases where one or both players randomize.
The following definition, taken from KL, provides a measure of closeness between two strategy profiles (and hence between the probability distributions over paths of play induced by those profiles). The definition for player 2 is similar.
REMARK 1: This is weak learning, weak in the sense that the player is required to make an accurate prediction only about finite continuation histories, not about the infinite tail of the game. REMARK 2: KL shows that if, instead of (1) in Definition 2, (0r1, c2) and (o-l, o-2) satisfy the stronger requirement , u2)(E) > 0 =* A(r21 )(E) > 0 for all measurable sets of paths E, then part 2 in Definition 2 will be satisfied automatically, and indeed player 1 will be able to make accurate predictions even about the tail of the game. If this strengthened version of part 1 holds, then /L( (r2) is said to be absolutely continuous with respect to ,u(Oyl,i); this is the KL sufficient condition to which I alluded in Section 1.4.1.
An observation exploited below is that a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for absolute continuity is that player l's belief satisfies what KL calls grain of truth: r2l satisfies grain of truth iff o2-= ao2 + (1 -a)o-2, where o02 is player 2's true behavior strategy, o2-is some other behavior strategy for player 2 (which, by Kuhn's Theorem, one may reinterpret as a probability distribution over behavior strategies), and a E [0,1). In the terminology introduced above, I-2j satisfies grain of truth iff o-2j gives weight to {o02).
Optimization As usual, 01 E X1 is an (ex ante) best response to belief or2 E X2 iff for any e E1 V(o-1, o-) 2 V( I-, o-). For learning models along the lines considered
here, one wishes 01 to be not only ex ante optimal but also dynamically optimal in the following sense: for any h such that Au(<, U,2,)(C(h)) > 0 (any h that the player believes will occur with positive probability), one wishes the continuation strategy ulh to be a best response to the continuation belief co2h. If o-l satisfies this dynamic optimization condition, then write 01 E BR(of,21). For 8 > 0, 01 E BR1(o-21) if 01 is an ex ante best response to o21. If 8 = 0, BRI(o-21) will (except in trivial cases) be a proper subset of the set of ex ante best responses to u-2. Henceforth, the term "best response" for player 1 will be understood to refer to an element of BR1(o-2). It is standard that, for any 8 E [0,1), BR1(cr2j) #0. Similar definitions hold for player 2.
The following technical lemma extends to discounted repeated games a result that is well known for finite games. As there does not appear to be a proof readily available in the literature, one is provided in the Appendix. LEMMA S: If ol e BR1(o21) and ol e X1 shares the support of O'J, then a* E BR1( ro2); similarly for Player 2.
I will also be interested in approximate best responses. Recall that 0i, is an (ex ante) e-best response to o2-iff, for any o-r, V(or1, o-2) + e 2 V(o-r, o21). Even when 8> 0, ex ante optimization is too weak an optimization standard for learning models of the sort considered here. First, ex ante e optimization imposes no restriction on behavior far out in the repeated game. Second, ex ante e optimization may impose little or no restriction on behavior along the actual path of play, as opposed to the paths the player believed most likely to occur, even in the near or medium term. I address these problems by strengthening the ex ante e optimization to what will be called uniform e optimization.19 DEFINITION 3: ai eX1 is a uniform e-best response to a21 E 2 written al E BRf(o2l), iff, for every history h for which ta7 i2)(C(h)) > 0, oh is an e-best response to a2lh. Similarly for BR-(Cr2).
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PREDICTION AND OPTIMIZATION
Conventionality and Neutrality
Let X1 c X1 denote the set of Player l's strategies that are, for want of a better term, conventional. For motivation, see Section 1.2.2. Similarly, the conventional strategies for Player 2 are X2 C X2. The joint conventional set is X1 X X2. Restrict attention to conventional sets that are not empty: Xi 0.
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, I wish to confine attention to joint conventional sets that are neutral. The definition of neutrality, given below, will be in terms of a function ' that assigns joint conventional sets to repeated games. To formalize the domain of I, begin by fixing a set A of finite action sets. I interpret A as the universe of possible action sets. For any set K, let #K denote the cardinality of K. Assume that 0 OA (a player always has at least one action in any game) and that, for any action sets A, A' I A, if #A < #A' then there is an A* EA such that #A* = #A and A* cA'. Take A to be the same for both players. Let G be the set of possible finite games using action sets drawn from A and let X be the associated power set of the set of possible repeated game strategies.
Let follows. gi is defined by the property that, for any aci E A(Ai), for any ai EA i, gi( ai) assigns the same probability to gi(ai) that ai does to ai. I is defined by the property that, for any T (g1(a1), g2(a2) ).
, for any h EXT, tb(h) E(= PT and, for any t < T, if the t coordinate of h is (al, a2), then the t coordinate of t(h) is
(In the special case of the null history, (h0) = h.) yi is defined by, for any rEE Xi, for any h' s ', 'y(cr)(h') = gi(of(Q-l(h'))).
Informally, yi(cr) is the strategy in Xi' that is equivalent to Cre Xi once one translates A(A ) into A(A') and " into k'.
Next, if A =A' for each i, then I will also consider, in addition to bijections gi, functions g!: Ai -* Ai, possibly not 1-1, and associated functions g: A(A ) -A(A ) and yif: Xi -Xi. gi? is defined by the property that, for any ai E A(A ), for any at* eA1, the probability assigned by g?(a1) to at equals the sum of the probabilities assigned by ai to all ai e g?-1 (a*). yi? is defined by, for any cr E Xi, for any h Es, A strategy cannot be optimal if a player can learn to predict that its continuation will be suboptimal in some continuation game. As an application of this principle, the next proposition records that, provided there are no weakly dominant actions in the stage game, a pure strategy s1 cannot be optimal if player 1 can learn to predict the path of play generated by (S1, S2) for any E S2. The hurdle to a result of this sort is that, even if the player learns to predict the path of play, it can be difficult for a player to learn that he is suboptimizing with respect to his opponent's strategy. For example, a player might think that the low payoffs he (correctly) projects for the near future are simply the price to be paid for the high payoffs he (erroneously) projects for the more distant future. The first part of the proposition assumes away this sort of problem by taking players to be effectively myopic. The second part of the proposition allows players to have any level of patience, but imposes Assumption M. The proof is in the Appendix. PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that no action for player 1 is weakly dominant in the stage game G.
yfNu)(h) = g?(o(h)).
Informally, yi`(o-) is identical to a except that, whenever oa chooses a1, yif(o-) chooses g ?(ad). Finally, consider any A (A. Let {: A xA -+A xA be a bijection on the set of action profiles. Let *=K(A, A) and let X = X1(A, A) = X2(A, A). Then g induces bijections t ;: Z '* and y : X --X, defined as follows. ) t is defined by the property that, for any T, for any h EApT, b {(h) (foT and, for any t < T, if the t coordinate of h is (a, a'), then the t coordinate of t ;(h) is {(a, a'). (In the special case of the null history, b '(h0) = h?.) y is defined by the property that, for each ore X, for each h' es, Syc(cr)(h') = c:r(b C-'(h')).
Informally, yc(cr) is identical to ar except that, upon receiving the history h' as input, y (o-) first translates h' into b C(h').
1. There is an -E > 0 and a 8 E (0,1] such that, for any pure strategy SI E S, and any 52 E S2(S1) if player l's belief o2-allows player 1 to learn to predict the continuation path of play generated by (S1, S2), then s, is not a uniform e-best  response to o(2-for any E E [0, -E) and any 8 E [0, 8) .
2. If, moreover, Assumption M holds, then there is an -E > 0 such that, for any pure strategy s, E S, and any 52 E S2(S1), if player l's belief o2I allows player 1 to learn to predict the continuation path of play generated by (S1 I2), then s, is not a uniform e-best response to o(21 for any E E [0, -E) and any 8 E [0, 1).
Similar results hold for player 2.
The next step in the argument is to make the following observation, the proof of which is in the Appendix. In particular, the Theorem is robust to relaxing Property 5 of neutrality to allow for the possibility that conventional strategies necessarily tremble. A trembled version of a pure strategy s, is a strategy 0l such that, after any history h, o-1(h) chooses s1(h) with probability (1 -qh) and chooses some mixture over actions, where the mixture might depend on h, with probability qhe2l Let i =suphE=q. For q small, 0l will be close to s in the sup norm topology. It is straightforward to show that if Property 5 of neutrality is relaxed to allow small trembles, then versions of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 continue to hold and therefore the conclusion of the Theorem continues to hold. Of course, if players are constrained to play strategies that tremble, then one should demand only approximate, in particular uniform e, optimization rather than full optimization. I will address this point in Remark 8 in Section 3.4.1.
A consequence of the Theorem is the following. Q.E.D.
As an application of Proposition 3, suppose that the Xi are defined by a bound on strategic complexity. I will focus on bounds defined in terms of Turing machines, which can be though of as computers with unbounded memory. I will remark briefly below on other possible complexity bounds.
Say that a strategy is Tunrng implementable if there is a Turing machine that takes histories (encoded in machine readable form) as input and produces the name of an action as output.22 The Turing implementable strategies are precisely those that can be defined recursively, where I use the term "recursive" in its Recursive Function Theory sense. Equivalently, the Turing implementable strategies are precisely those that can be defined by a finite flow chart or program. The Church-Turing Thesis, which is generally (although not quite universally) accepted within mathematics, asserts that recursivity captures what one means by "computable in principle." The set of Turing implementable strategies is thus the largest set of computable strategies. It is a natural benchmark for a conventional set that is a large subset of the set of all strategies.
Turing machines, as usually defined, are deterministic and so the Turing implementable strategies are pure. (Randomizing Turing machines will be considered in Section 3.4.1.) Let ST c Si be the set of pure strategies for player i that are Turing implementable. ST is countable.23 Therefore, player l's belief can give weight to all of S'. For computability reasons, I will assume that the payoff functions ui are rational valued and that the discount factor 8 is rational. PROOF: The result for optimization, rather than uniform e optimization, follows from Proposition 3 provided ST x ST is neutral. Verification of the latter is straightforward and is omitted. The extension to uniform E optimization is immediate once one notes that Proposition 1 is stated for uniform e optimiza-22A more formal treatment of Turing implementability for repeated game strategies can be found in, for example, Nachbar and Zame (1996). For general reference on Turing machines and other topics in computability, see Cutland (1980) or Odifreddi (1987) . 23Ay Turing machine has a finite description, hence there are only a countable number of Turing machines, hence only a countable number of strategies are Turing implementable. tion and that, therefore, the proof of the Theorem extends to uniform E optimization provided X1 c Si (conventional strategies are pure).
Q.E.D.
REMARK 4: Although stated for Turing implementable strategies, Proposition 4 holds for any standard bound on complexity: any standard complexity bound generates a joint conventional set that is (1) neutral and (2) at most countable. Hence Proposition 3 implies that, for conventional sets defined by any standard complexity bound, if player 1 has beliefs that give weight to all of player 2's conventional strategies, player 1 has no conventional best response or even, for E small, uniform E-best response. In this sense, player l's best response will always be more complicated than the strategies that are conventional for player 2.
REMARK 5: For intuition for Proposition 4, consider the following. Say that a belief o2j that gives weight to all of X2 C S2j iS Turing computable if there is a Turing machine that generates the belief in the form of an enumeration of pairs of probabilities and Turing machine descriptions, which I will refer to as programs, with each strategy in X2 implemented by at least one program in the enumeration. If beliefs are Turing computable then, for any 6 > 0, there exists a Turing machine implementing a uniform E-best response. Indeed, one can construct a Turing machine that, after any history, computes a finite approximation to the correct posterior belief, then computes a best response with respect to that approximate posterior for some large truncation of the continuation game. Because of discounting, this best response in the truncation will be an approximate best response in the full continuation. One can show, although I will not do so here, that all the calculations required are well within the scope of a Turing machine.
The problem that arises in Proposition 4 is that a belief that gives weight to all of X2 = S2T is not Turing computable because there is no Turing machine that will enumerate a list of strategy programs such that every Turing implementable strategy is implemented by at least one program on the list. This is so even though the set of Turing implementable strategies is countable. The proof, which I omit, is a variation on the diagonalization argument used in Turing (1936) to show that the set of recursive functions is not recursively enumerable.
Since beliefs that give weight to all of S2T are not Turing computable, a Turing machine has no way to update beliefs properly, even approximately, after some histories. As a result, the method given above for constructing a uniform 6-best response does not apply. Proposition 4 verifies that, for 6 sufficiently small, no uniform E-best response can be implemented by a Turing machine. Another way to view the same point is to recognize that, by Kuhn's Theorem, having a belief that is not Turing computable is equivalent to facing an opponent playing a strategy that is not Turing implementable. It should not be surprising that, if the opposing strategy is not Turing implementable, one may not have a Turing implementable best response or even, for E small, uniform E-best response.
Extensions
Constrained Rational Players
The analysis thus far has implicitly maintained the hypothesis that players are free to choose nonconventional strategies in order to optimize. If instead players are constrained to play conventional strategies (see Section 1.2.4 for motivation), then the Theorem implies that, so long as Conventional Prediction holds, neither player will be able to optimize. One might hope that, despite the constraint, players could at least uniformly E optimize. If this were true then a small modification of the argument in KL would imply asymptotic convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium play.
Proposition 4 has already exploited the fact that if all conventional strategies are pure, then the Theorem's proof, and hence the Theorem itself, extends immediately to cover uniform E optimization. Thus, for E small, so long as Conventional Prediction holds, the constraint prevents the players from choosing strategies that are uniformly E optimal. This does not, of course, prevent a player from choosing a strategy that is ex ante E optimal. But, as illustrated in Section 1.3, ex ante E optimization per se may not be enough to guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium play.
If, on the other hand, the conventional set contains nonpure strategies, then the proof of the Theorem does not extend. The difficulty is that Lemma S is false for uniform E optimization: even if a strategy of is uniformly E optimal, some of the pure strategies in its support may not be. 
Boundedly Rational Players
A boundedly rational player is one for whom deliberation is costly. There is, unfortunately, no consensus as to how bounded rationality should be modeled. I will assume that a bounded rational player is essentially a Turing machine, and that it is this Turing machine that formulates a belief that fashions a response.
If a player is a Turing machine, then his belief will (almost by definition) be computable. As noted in Remark 5, this implies that each player will be able to uniformly E optimize. As also noted in Remark 5, since a player's belief is computable, the belief cannot give weight to all of his opponent's Turing implementable strategies. For example, the belief might assign positive probability only to opposing strategies that are implementable by a finite automaton. Define the conventional set for player i to be the strategies to which his opponent assigns positive probability.
If the joint conventional set is neutral, then a variant of Proposition 4 (or, if randomization is permitted, of Proposition 5, provided conventional sets are sufficiently rich in the sense discussed in Remark 6) tells us that, for 6 small, players will choose nonconventional (but still Turing implementable) strategies in order to uniformly E optimize.
If, on the other hand, bounded rationality implies that neutrality fails, then it is possible for Conventional Uniform E Optimization to hold even for E arbitrarily small. One might thus be in the ironic position of being able to construct a theory of rational learning along the lines proposed when, but only when, players are only boundedly rational. But a failure of neutrality, in and of itself, does not assure Conventional Uniform E Optimization. For Conventional Uniform E Optimization, neutrality must fail the right away, excluding certain strategies but not others. Exactly which strategies will depend on the game. It is not clear why bounded rationality would imply that neutrality would fail in a way that facilitates Conventional Uniform e Optimization rather than impedes it. It follows that a, e BRi(a2l). The proof then follows by contraposition.27
Dept. of Economics
25 Since the set of finite histories is countably infinite, 21 can be viewed as the product set A(A1), where A(A1) is viewed as the unit simplex in R#*A. Endow A(A1) with the standard Euclidean topology and endow A(A1l) with the product topology. 26 In particular, one can construct such a sequence by enumerating the finite histories and, for each k, defining alk(h) to equal a,*(h) for each of the first k histories, and to equal al(h) otherwise. 27 The proof exploits the continuity of VI, which follows from the fact that repeated game payoffs are evaluated as a present value. If payoffs were instead evaluated by limit of means, continuity would fail and the Lemma would be false. For example, consider the two-player stage game in which player 2 has only one action and player 1 has two actions, Left, yielding 0, and Right, yielding 1. Under limit of means, it is a best response (to his only possible belief) for player 1 to play the strategy "following any history of length t, play Left with probability 2', Right with probability 1 -2-'." Under this strategy, player 1 plays Left with positive probability in every period. Thus the pure strategy "play Left always" is in the support of this behavior strategy even though this pure strategy is not a best response. Once again, consider any pure strategy s, E S1 and any S2 E S2(sl). Temporarily fix 1 > 0 and an integer 1 > 0. Suppose that player 1 learns to predict the continuation path of play. Then, for any continuation game beginning at time t + 1, t > t(i1, 1), player 1 assigns some probability (1 -1') > (1 -q) to the actual I-period continuation history beginning at date t + 1. In that finite continuation history, player 1 receives at most maxal e A, u,(a,, d2(al)) per period. On the other hand, player 1 believes that there is a probability iq' that the continuation history might be something else. In an alternate i-period continuation history, player 1 could receive at most UlI per period. Finally, from date t + I + 1 onwards, player 1 could receive at most uI per period. Thus beginning at date t + 1, player 1 expects to earn at most -8 (1 -q') maA ul(al2(al)) + 'u71 ] + _ , .
In contrast, any best response must expect to earn at least ml, on average, following any history given positive probability by /u(1, s2). Thus, under a true best response, player 1 expects to earn at PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: I begin by sketching how a Turing machine can be made to randomize. Recall that a Turing machine operates by executing a sequence of discrete computational steps. In each such step, a standard (i.e. deterministic) Turing machine reads one bit (consisting of either a 0 or a 1) out of memory, consults its current state (a Turing machine has a finite number of abstract attributes called states), and then, according to a preset deterministic rule that takes as input the value of the bit read from memory and the state, the machine may alter the bit in the current memory location, it may change its state, and it may move to a different memory location. The customary way to handle randomization is to add to the description of a Turing machine a finite number of special states corresponding to one or more coins, possibly biased. If random state f is entered, the machine leaves its memory alone but switches with probabilities p(Q): (1 -p(Q)) to one of two ordinary states. For computability reasons, p(Q) is assumed to be rational. With randomizing Turing machines, there is a subtlety regarding whether the Turing implementable strategy plays an action for certain after any history or just with probability 1. For the sake of generality, I will allow for the latter. Since the number of random states is finite and since the p( ) are rational, each randomizing Turing machine has a finite description and so the set of strategies implemented by such machines is countable. Let al E NT and S, E S2T be as above. Since player l's beliefs give weight to all of X2, which is countable, player 1 learns to predict the path of play generated by (a,, s'). In particular, for almost any path of play z, for any continuation game beginning at time t + 1, t > t(,q, 1, z) (that is 1 = 1), player 1 assigns some probability By the continuity of expectation, and the definition of wl, inequality (1) will hold provided a' is sufficiently close to a1. Since M has only a finite number of random states, the accuracy of the estimate a' improves geometrically with the depth of the simulation (number of times random states are hit). Moreover, since one can program knowledge of the p(f ) into MV, MV will be able to calculate whether a depth has been reached sufficient to ensure that its estimate a' is close enough to a that inequality (1) holds. Therefore, MV calculates s?(h) in finite time.
There are two reasons to have MV approximate a, rather than to calculate it exactly. First, if M chooses an action only with probability 1, rather than for certain, then MV may be unable to calculate a1 exactly. In particular, if MV attempts to calculate a, by the above algorithm, it may never arrive at an answer, and so it may fail to choose an action. Second, even if M always chooses an action, taking an approximation rather than computing a1 exactly is desirable because it reduces the complexity of MV. In particular, by taking an approximation, the number of computational steps required by MV can be held to a multiple of the number expected for M, and may even be smaller than the worst case for M.
